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自分のスケジュールですぐに学習を始めてください。

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約43時間で修了

推奨:10 weeks of study, 4 hours per week...

英語

字幕:英語

100%オンライン

自分のスケジュールですぐに学習を始めてください。

柔軟性のある期限

スケジュールに従って期限をリセットします。

約43時間で修了

推奨:10 weeks of study, 4 hours per week...

英語

字幕:英語

シラバス - 本コースの学習内容

1
3時間で修了

The firm

Our first lecture is devoted to building a microeconomic foundation, which is necessary for understanding the lectures to come. In the beginning segment we will say a few words about the course and, then, we will focus on the concept of the firm. We will try to define what a firm actually is and why business is organized based on the notion of the firm. We will talk about technology, economies of scale, concentration, informational asymmetries, hold-up and we will present our first case study: GM vs. Fisher Body. It may seem to you that you have heard some of this lecture’s terms before, or you already know them, but reviewing them and deeply understanding them will be essential for the continuation of the course.

...
10件のビデオ (合計83分), 2 readings, 1 quiz
10件のビデオ
1. Tour of the course4 分
2. What is a firm?7 分
3. The technological view12 分
4. Economies and concentration6 分
5. Incomplete contract9 分
6. Informational asymmetries10 分
7. Long-run relationship8 分
8. Vertical relationship model11 分
9. Case: GM vs. Fisher Body9 分
2件の学習用教材
Welcome note2 分
Readings & Links2 分
1の練習問題
The firm1 時間
2
3時間で修了

Game theory foundations

In this lecture we will focus on the principles of strategic interaction. The most important tool to understand strategy is game theory. We will define and explain different categories of games. The ultimate goal of this lecture is to enable you to use game theory so that you can model interaction and negotiations. We will talk about equilibrium in dominant strategies, which is a non-strategic equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium and the prisoner’s dilemma. We will get acquainted with static, repeated and dynamic games. I will tell you a real story of prisoner’s dilemma and we will have an extended example on firm interaction with “Energon vs. Orange”.

...
10件のビデオ (合計98分), 1 reading, 1 quiz
10件のビデオ
2. The bi-matrix and strict dominance10 分
3. Dominant Equilibrium6 分
4. Nash Equilibrium13 分
5. Interesting cases of NE8 分
6. The prisoner’s dilemma5 分
7. Case: The cheater’s dilemma10 分
8. Repeated games10 分
9. Dynamic games8 分
10. Example: Energon vs. Orange13 分
1件の学習用教材
Readings & Links2 分
1の練習問題
Game theory foundations1 時間
3
3時間で修了

Static competition

The topic of this lecture is short-run competition. That is, interaction that lasts only for one period. Static competition is not the most usual form of competition but it is not rare, either. Most of the principles that we will present in this lecture will carry over to the dynamic competition analysis later. There are two different kinds of static competition. The first is when strategic variables have a positive causative relationship, as in competition with prices. The second is when the strategic variables are negatively related, as in competition with quantities. We will cover interesting notions such as first-mover advantage, the Bertrand Paradox, capacity constraints, differentiated products, and will introduce the notion of collusion that will be of major importance for our future lectures.

...
10件のビデオ (合計95分), 1 reading, 1 quiz
10件のビデオ
2. Competition in quantities12 分
3. Application: Linear demand – constant cost11 分
4. First mover advantage12 分
5. Competition in prices9 分
6. The Bertrand Paradox5 分
7. Capacity constraints8 分
8. Differentiated products9 分
9. Application: Differentiated products6 分
10. The prospect of collusion10 分
1件の学習用教材
Readings & Links2 分
1の練習問題
Static competition1 時間
4
3時間で修了

Dynamic competition

We extend the analysis of competition introducing interactions with time depth. We will use several concepts from the previous lectures but here we have two important qualitative differences. When competition lasts for more than one period, players develop reputations and are given the opportunity to retaliate in case they are cheated upon. Reputation and retaliation may alter the outcome of interaction in comparison to interactions that last only for one period. We will talk about repetitive and dynamic interactions, collusion, renegotiation, price wars, antitrust and detection mechanisms.

...
10件のビデオ (合計100分), 1 reading, 1 quiz
10件のビデオ
2. Infinite horizon12 分
3. Renegotiation9 分
4. Price wars14 分
5. Establishing collusion14 分
6. Complications: asymmetries and heterogeneity7 分
7. Complications: volatility and structure8 分
8. Antitrust9 分
9. Prosecution is not straightforward8 分
10. Detection6 分
1件の学習用教材
Readings & Links2 分
1の練習問題
Dynamic competition1 時間

講師

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Kosmas Marinakis

Assistant Professor
ICEF and Faculty of Economics Sciences, HSE

ロシア国立研究大学経済高等学院(National Research University Higher School of Economics)について

National Research University - Higher School of Economics (HSE) is one of the top research universities in Russia. Established in 1992 to promote new research and teaching in economics and related disciplines, it now offers programs at all levels of university education across an extraordinary range of fields of study including business, sociology, cultural studies, philosophy, political science, international relations, law, Asian studies, media and communicamathematics, engineering, and more. Learn more on www.hse.ru...

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