[MUSIC] State, as something particular, is the only king of political system which is founded on rationality. The legitimacy of the State is coming from it's especial relation to rationality. All the other kinds of political system are different. Some of them are based on tradition, some others on charisma, but state is considered first of all, as a rational expression of the political order. For this reason, state is supposed to be universal. For this reason, State must be extended in all the parts of the world, even if cultures, histories, social structures are quite different from the western model. This exportation of the state model took place in America, toward America, during the 19th century and toward Africa and Asia with the decolonization process. If we take into account the American adventure, the process was rather successful for a very good reason. In the main culture in America North America and South America is coming from Europe. And the main state builders in all parts of America were trained as western leaders and were really trained by the western cultures, they are integrated. Now, it's quite different for the African and Asian case. For many reasons, and I would just point three reasons. The first is equation of temporality. The colonization implies to build the political system, the indefinite particle system, the sovereign particle system in very short time. The time of decolonization is quite different from the time of state building in Europe. Keep in mind that the European, the Western nation state, was built according to a long process which lasted several centuries, probably from the end of the Middle Age to the 19th century. But Africa and Asia and in this continent, those countries which were decolonized didn't have centuries for building their own prodigal system. They didn't have even some years, they had I would say, some minutes. Those minutes of the independence. The second reason, the second factor is of course the Western cultural hegemony. Which was very important, clear, obvious, dense, during the colonial period but even also at the time of decolonization. That's to say the only model that the leaders of independence had in mind was the western model. And for nationalist, African nationalists or Arab nationalists, the political model that they had to implement was obviously the Western state model. The third reason is a reason of political hegemony. That's to say to be admitted in the international arena in the second part of the 20th century. That's to say, the very moment of the colonization, implied to introduce itself as a state, as a formal state, if a new political system wanted to be admitted at the UN, it had to present the main attribute of the classical traditional Western model of state. These reasons transformed the state builders into importers. And this is probably one of the main features and the main ambiguities, even one of the main contradictions of decolonization. It's a contradiction because a state builder was strongly nationalist. And however, he had to build in his society, in his culture, a political system which was imitating the political system of the colonial power. This strong contradiction is probably at the basis of the process which took place during the colonization. These importers were all of them socialized by the Western culture through Christian missions. And you know how Christianism in Africa contributed to socialized and after to train the new leaders like Julius Nyerere in Tanzania in Tanganyika this time, or for instance Fulbert Youlou in the French Congo. Or the best nationalist leader, Michelle Affleck who was trained in the Christian school. So, Christianism is an important agent of this importation. The second one is Western universities. That's to say, the many nationalist leaders went to Western universities for being trained. Nehru, the great Indian nation, nationalist leader was training Cambridge. Or Kwame Nkrumah who is considered as one of the main progressors and anti western leaders of Africa and the first president of Ghana, was trained in Lincoln University in the US. And this is probably one of the main basis of this contradiction. That's to say, the nationalist ideology in Africa and in Asia was learnt in western universities and was shaped according to the main structure of meanings which are the characteristic of the western culture. The third action was the western parliament. Most of these leaders seated in the French or British Parliament, where they were trained, as like the Ivory Coast leader Houphouet-Boigny, was even minister in the French government of the First Republic. Or Mamadou Dia, and Léopold Sédar Senghor, in Senegal, and so on. And the force agent of socialization are the western parties. Socialist party, Communist party, which played a very important role in socializing Sekou Toure in Guinea, Ho Chi Minh was attending the congress of Tours in 1920 in which was created, the French Communist Party. And we can add also Zhou Enlai or Deng Xiaoping who were trained in France around this Communist and tyranny. These importers were triggering two kinds of importation. What I would call the conservative modernization, and what I would call the revolutionary modernization. Conservative modern is a way for keeping the throne, for the traditional princes, who were at power formally, or informally, during the colonial rule. And will try to save their throne and their crown by importing some lemons of this Western culture for consolidating their power and for bearing this new independence. In the case of Meiji, Japan, in the case of the Ottoman Empire, which was Westernized along the 19th century for reinforcing an Ottoman power which became more and more fragile. In the case of Persia, in the case of Siam, former, which was after Thailand, In the case of Burma and so on. And the revolutionary modernization is the same importation, but not for consolidating traditional legitimacy, but for breaking with traditional legitimacy, and for building a state on the basis of renewed legitimacy which was an important one. And this is another paradox, that's to say the revolutionary mobilization implied the mobilization of the traditional elements of the western culture for breaking with the traditional elements of the traditional order in Arab or African societies. The days, for instance, of Nasser in Egypt or the Baath Party in Syria or in Iraq, or the FLN in Algeria, and so on. Ladies and gentlemen, I set the question, can these importation be successful? Is it possible to import a state as someone would import a plant, a factory of cars or of different kinds of electronic activities? Of course not. This importation was widely a failure. It's a failure because these imported institutions were not legitimate. It's very difficult to conceive the legitimacy of the political order which has generated from inside but which is imported from outside. That's why in the new state in Africa or Asia and especially in the Arab world, the civil society and even the traditional civil society appears, nowadays, as more legitimate than the political power. Because the political power seems to import structure of meanings coming from abroad. And in this situation, power is getting authoritarian. The less of power is legitimate the more it's authoritarian. And this is probably the main source of authoritarianism that we can find in newly independent countries. And for this reasons also, this power is effected by a strong extraversion. That's to say, why they are not legitimate inside, they have to look for outside some new resources. That's why these new leaders are particularly more dependent on powers and Western powers, also Eastern powers. This is also, as we will see later, one of the sources of collapsing state and of war societies that we can observe in Africa, or in the Arab world, and even in Asia. That's why this contradiction between the state, coming from abroad, and oppression coming from the local society, is one of the main features of this new world and this new north versus south. [MUSIC]
